Bail Pending Appeal in California
By Hon. John B. Molinari*
THE

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION provides that "All persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is

evident or the presumption great ... ." Although this provision appears to

be sufficiently broad to embrace cases involving offenses less than capital
in degree before and after conviction, it has been interpreted to mean that
a party is entitled to bail as a matter of right only in those cases where he
has not already been convicted.' This difference in status of a defendant
before and after conviction finds its basis both in judicial decisions and
in the statutes, and arises from the fact that upon conviction the defendant loses the benefit of the presumption of innocence and is presumed to be
guilty.' Tempered by this concept, the statutes4 and judicial decisions 5
have evolved the principle that before conviction a defendant is entitled
to be admitted to bail "as a matter of right" in all cases except where he is
charged with an offense punishable with death "when the proof of his
guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great"; but, after his conviction, he is entitled to be admitted to bail as a "matter of right" only in
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1
Article I, Sec. 6 (Constitution of 1849 as revised in 1879).
Note: There is no constitutional right to bail pending review under the Federal Constitution. (Harlan v. McGouria (1910) 218 U.S. 442.) Amendment 8 to the United States Constitution provides only that "Excessive bail shall not be required ...." In federal courts admission to bail is governed by rules of court. Bail prior to conviction is mandatory in most cases.
(Fed. R.Crim.P. 46(a) (1).) Upon conviction, and pending review, "Bail may be allowed . ..
unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous and taken for delay. . . ." (Fed. R.Crim.P.
46(a) (2) ; see Ward v. United States, I L.Ed.2d 25; 76 S.Ct. 1063.)
2Ex Parte Voll (1871), 41 Cal. 29, 32; Ex Parte Brown (1885), 68 Cal. 176, 177; In re
Scaggs (1956) 47 Cal.2d 416, 418.
3In re Scaggs, supra.
4Section 1270 of the Penal Code provides: "A defendant charged with an offense punishable with death cannot be admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great. The finding of an indictment does not add to the strength of the
proof or the presumptions to be drawn therefrom."
Section 1271 of the Penal Code provides: "If the charge is for any other offense, he
may be admitted to bail before conviction, as a matter of right."
Section 1272 of the Penal Code provides: "After conviction of an offense not punishable with death, a defendant who has appealed may be admitted to bail:
1. As a matter of right, when the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine only.
2. As a matter of right, when the appeal is from a judgment imposing imprisoriment in
cases of misdemeanor.
3. As a matter of discretion in all other cases."
5 See People v. Scaggs, supra. In re Brumback (1956) 46 Cal.2d 810, 813.
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misdemeanor cases, and in felony cases where the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine only;-in all other felony cases his admission to bail
is a "matter of discretion." 6
THE QUALITY OF THE DISCRETION EXERCISED

Although the discretion criterion with respect to bail after conviction
has been recognized in California since 1871 when our Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Ex Parte Voll,7 the quality of the discretion exercised has not always been governed by the same guideposts. In Voll it was
held that upon appeal a person convicted of a felony was to be admitted to
bail, or bail refused, as a matter of discretion merely. However, in Ex
Parte Hoge' it was held that the discretion of the judge ought to be exercised in favor of granting bail on appeal upon the rationale that, since
the right to appeal is guaranteed by the Constitution, it would not be consonant to our ideas of justice "that even while the question of guilt or
innocence is yet being agitated in the form of an appeal, the prisoner
should be undergoing the very punishment and suffering the very infamy
which it was the lawful purpose of the appeal to avert." 9 The rule laid
down in the Hoge case was said to have been modified in Ex Parte Marks,'
by reason of the enactment of Penal Code section 1243 providing for a
certificate of probable cause. The rationale of the Marks case was that
since the proceedings in execution of sentence could be stayed by the
issuance of a certificate of probable cause, the prisoner was sufficiently protected pending appeal by his detention in the county jail to abide the judgment of the reviewing court. The Marks case did, however, announce the
rule that bail on appeal should not be allowed except where a certificate
of probable cause was issued and then "only in cases where circumstances
of an extraordinary character have intervened."" (Emphasis added.)
The "extraordinary circumstances" rule was considered in Ex Parte
Smallman"2 which, while noting that the discretion to be used was not an
arbitrary one, held that the extraordinary circumstances must be such as
to distinguish "a particular case from the general mass of other criminal
cases, and appealing more or less strongly to the discretion of the court to
6 At common law all applications for bail were addressed to the discretion of the court.
(Ex parte Voll, supra.) This rule was held not to have been altered by the California Constitution so far as cases after conviction were concerned in Ex Parte Voll, supra. (See also Ex
Parte Brown, supra; People v. Scaggs, supra.)
7 41 Cal. 30 (1871).

848 Cal. 3 (1874).
9Id. at 7.
10 49 Cal. 681 (1875).

11 Id. at 683.
1254 Cal. 35 (1879).
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admit the prisoner to bail, even after conviction." 1"This rule was subsequently followed by several Supreme Court cases and a number of appellate court decisions.14 Among them was the case of Ex Parte Turner1 5
where it was held that there must be an affirmative showing of some extraordinary circumstances before it could be said that the trial court's discretion was abused.
6 reiterated the extraIn 1930, the Supreme Court, in In Re Pantages,"
ordinary circumstances rule, noting that courts and judges should not
exercise the power to grant bail after conviction of a felony except "with
the greatest caution and only when the peculiar circumstances of the case
render it proper," 17 and held that where the showing of fact is sufficient to
meet this requirement judges and courts should not hesitate to give the
benefit of the law to the defendant. In that case the showing by the defendant in the lower court that he had suffered and was suffering heart
attacks due to heart disease and that further incarceration would result in
great and permanent injury to his health was held to be a sufficient showing of a peculiar circumstance warranting admission to bail pending
appeal.
Although the-Pantages case made no specific reference as to whether
the trial court had abused its discretion, such a holding was inferentially
made when the Supreme Court held that the showing made before the trial
court was sufficient to establish a peculiar circumstance warranting admission to bail pending appeal. The rule of the Pantages case with respect to
the existence of "peculiar circumstances," while not limited to appellate
courts by that decision, was interpreted by subsequent appellate court
decisions to be applicable only to the appellate courts, and that insofar
as trial courts were concerned, their function was merely restricted to the
exercise of the usual discretion conferred upon trial courts, the exercise of
which would not be disturbed by the reviewing court except in an instant
of manifest abuse.' 8
13 Id. at 36.
14 See People v. Marshall (1881) 59 Cal. 386; Ex Parte Brown, supra; Ex Parte Smith
(1891) 89 Cal. 79; Ex Parte Turner (1896) 112 Cal. 627; In re Ward (1900) 127 Cal. 489;
Ex Parte Hatch (1911) 15 Cal.App. 186; People v. Cornell (1915) 28 Cal.App. 654; Matter of
Preciado (1916) 30 Cal.App. 323; People v. Eiseman (1924) 69 Cal.App. 143; In re Wilkins
(1924) 66 Cal.App. 754; People v. Ephraim (1925) 72 Cal.App. 480; People v. Ephraim
(1926) 73 Cal.App. 104; In re Albori (1928) 95 Cal.App. 42; People v. Yant (1938) 26 Cal.
App.2d 124.
15 112 Cal. 627 (1896).
16 209 Cal. 535 (1930).
17 Id. at 536.

18 See In re Burnette (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 358; People v. Davis (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d
837; People v. Sullivan (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 4; and see In re Fishman (1952) 109 Cal.
App.2d 632; In re Fishman (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 634.
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Whatever misgivings there might have been as to the applicability of
the "extraordinary circumstances" rule, these were put to rest in In Re
Brumback."9 There the trial judge had taken the position that he had no
discretion to allow bail on appeal in the absence of a showing of extraordinary circumstances. In holding that the trial judge's action amounted
to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction the Supreme Court noted that the rule
of "extraordinary circumstances" applied by the trial judge was a rule
"promulgated principally as an aid to the exercise of the discretion of an
appellate tribunal. '

2

0

Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated the appli-

cable rule for a trial judge to be that he has the primary discretion to
determine whether a defendant should be admitted to bail and that such
discretion must be a sound legal one to be exercised in the light of all the
attending circumstances which, if passed upon on the merits, will not be
disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion appears. With respect to
intervening extraordinary circumstances it was stated in Brumback
moreover, that their absence "cannot prevent the trial judge from acting
or excuse his failure to act, although their presence properly may influence
his discretion," and it was particularly noted that "The requirement of
intervening extraordinary circumstances is a self-imposed criterion for the
guidance of appellate courts and individual appellate justices in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. 21
In addition to pointing out the respective areas for the exercise of discretion both by trial and appellate courts, the Brumback case promulgates
the fundamental rule that in the exercise of their discretion both trial
judges and appellate justices should recognize "that the primary purpose
of bail, before or after conviction, is practical assurance that defendant
will attend upon the court when his presence is required." 22 In making
this statement the Supreme Court appears to be harkening back to Ex
ParteHoge.23
The cardinal rule of the Brumback case that the primary purpose of
bail, whether before or after conviction, is "practical assurance that defendant will attend upon the court when his presence is required" has been
2 5 and in In Re
since reiterated in In Re Scaggs,' in In Re Petersen,
Newbern,26 where the court refers to such purpose as the "only permis19 46 Cal.2d 810 (1956).
20
Id. at 813.
21 Id. at 815.
22 Id. at 813.
23 48 Cal. 3 (1874).
24 47 Cal.2d 416, 419 (1956).
2551 Cal.2d 177, 181 (1958).
26 55 Cal.2d 500, 504 (1961).
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sible purpose." 27 In Scaggs, however, it was particularly noted that this
rule is not inflexible and that other matters may be considered in determining whether a convicted defendant should be retained in custody pending appeal, one important consideration being whether there is any danger
28
that, if released, he would continue to commit crime.
In view of the foregoing it appears to be the established rule in California that both trial and appellate courts should exercise their discretion
in favor of granting bail, after conviction and pending appeal in a felony
case, where the defendant affirmatively shows the court by practical assurance that he will attend upon the court at all times when his presence is
required. The burden of this showing is, in the first instance, upon the
defendant since he appears before the court as a convicted felon and is
laboring under the presumption that he was properly convicted. In aid of,
and supplementary to the showing of unlikeliness of flight, it would appear
that the defendant should be able to present to the court whose discretion
he is invoking evidence of intervening extraordinary circumstances, such
as illness, the discovery of evidence tending to show his innocence, or
other circumstances distinguishing the case from the general mass of other
criminal cases.29 Additionally the defendant should be permitted to show
such facts as will appeal more or less strongly to the discretion of the
court, such as his character and past record, his conduct and attitude after
apprehension, the unlikelihood that he will be a danger or threat to
society while his appeal is pending, the length of the sentence, the circumstance that he would be treated more harshly by being denied bail on
appeal than he was in the matter of probation and punishment, and that
his appeal is meritorious in the sense that it presents debatable issues of
law.

30

In opposition to the defendant's showing the prosecution should show
why bail should be denied, and in conjunction therewith should present
facts which are the converse of those which would influence a court to
grant bail.3 ' Accordingly, it is upon the merits of the application for bail
Id. at 504.
Cal.2d 416, 419 (1956).
29 See In re Burnette, supra; In re Pantages, supra; In re Wilkins, supra; Ex Parte Turner,
supra; Ex Parte Voll, supra; Matter of Preciado, supra, p. 325; In re Ward (1900) 127 Cal.
489, 490; Ex Parte Smallman, supra; and see In re Brumback, supra, p. 815.
30 See In re McCaughan (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 690; In re Torres (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d
579; and see Penal Code §§1275 and 1291; see also Witkin, Cal.Crim.Proc. §678, p. 633.
31 See Rehman v. California (1964) 85 S.Ct. 8, 13 L.Ed.2d 17, where Justice Douglas
alone, in denying an application for bail, found support for the trial judge's exercise of discretion in revoking bail on the ground that it would involve a public danger where the petitioner doctor had been convicted in California for fraudulent exaction of fees, conspiracy,
involving assault and other offenses. The doctor had been previously admitted to bail on
27

2847
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that the question of discretion turns, and when the discretion exercised is
a sound legal discretion it will not be disturbed on appeal.
THE APPLICATION BEFORE THE TRIAL JUDGE

As already pointed out the primary discretion in the matter of bail on
appeal resides in the trial court. Accordingly, the application must, in the
first instance, be addressed to the trial court since it has been settled practice for an appellate court to refuse to act upon a bail application before
disposition of the matter upon the merits in the trial court upon the rationale that "the facts and circumstances going to make up the legal discretion
in the sound exercise of which the prisoner may be admitted to bail are
necessarily within the knowledge of the Judge who presided at the trial." 32
Moreover, it should be noted that under Rule 32(b) of the California
Rules of Court an application to the lower court is a condition to an application to an appellate court.1
Upon a proper showing on the merits the trial judge is empowered to
grant bail though no intervening circumstance has occurred. 4 Where such
an intervening circumstance has occurred, and the same is presented to the
trial judge as a discretionary factor, he should consider it. It should be
particularly noted that the denial of one application for admission to bail
does not preclude another application where intervening circumstances
require its renewal, provided that, in keeping with the long-established
policy calling for exhaustion of remedy in trial courts, such application is
made in the first instance to the trial court, and if practicable, to the judge

before whom the defendant was tried.

5

THE APPLICATION BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT

The power of the appellate court to grant bail on appeal exists under
Penal Code §1490 providing that the writ of habeas corpus may issue to
condition that he surrender his medical license. Justice Douglas in a previous application for
relief pending disposition of a petition for certiorari had nullified the conditon of probaton
on the basis that it might deny due process.
32
People v. Perdue (1874) 48 Cal. 552, 553; In re Brumback, supra, pp. 816-817; Matter
of Preciado, supra, p. 328; In re Malotte (1955)

134 Cal.App.2d 58, 59.

33 Rule 32(b), in pertinent part, provides that an application to the reviewing court for
bail or to reduce bail on an appeal pending therein ". . . shall include a showing that proper
application for bail or a reduction of bail was made to the superior court and that such court
unjustifiably denied the application."
34 In re Brumback, supra, p. 815.

35 Ex Parte Turner, supra, p. 629; People v. Perdue, supra; Ex Parte January (1886) 70
Cal. 34, 35; People v. Oreck (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 317, 318; see In re Brumback, supra, p. 817.
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secure admission to bail,3 6 as well as under Rule 32(b) of the California
Rules of Court. Where the lower court has considered the application on
its merits and has denied it, or has imposed what is deemed to be excessive bail,3 7 an application may be made to the appellate court pursuant to
Rule 32(b) which provides that it shall be made on "such notice to the
district attorney and the Attorney General as the court may determine."
In considering the application the appellate court "may act where an
abuse of discretion appears and regardless of the existence of intervening
extraordinary circumstances," but where such circumstances have occurred, "affirmative action by the upper court may be appropriate though
no abuse of discretion in the trial court appears." 38
Pending a hearing on his application an applicant may be released on
bail. 9 If the appellate court, upon a consideration of the application, finds
the showing of abuse of discretion sufficient, or finds that intervening
extraordinary circumstances appear, it has available to it two methods of
procedure. It may remand the proceedings to the trial court with instructions to that court to fix bail, 40 or it may itself fix the bail.4 ' In the latter
instance it may order the bail deposited with the appellate court clerk42 or
43
order that the bond be approved by the lower court.
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the strong indication by our Supreme Court that the
primary purpose of bail on appeal is practical assurance that the defendant
will attend, a large number of applications presented to the appellate courts
are being denied. A review of the records in the appellate courts discloses
that, while many applications are denied on the basis that no abuse of dis36 In re Brumback, supra, p. 815 where it is noted that under the California Constitution
(Art. VI. §§4 and 4b) there is conferred to the Supreme Court and the District Courts of
Appeal, and each individual justice thereof, the right to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
37 In re Newbern, supra, p. 504, it was held that since the only permissible purpose of bail
is "practical assurance that he will attend upon the court when his presence is required" that
end must be attained "without effectively negating what is a constitutional right by bail excessive in amount."
38 In re Brumback, supra, pp. 816-817.
39 See In re Fishman, supra, p. 633; In re Keddy (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 215, 217; and see
In re Malotte (1956) 46 Cal.2d 300.
4
o People v. Oreck, supra, p. 318; see In re Torres, supra, p. 582.
41 In re Torres, supra, p. 582; In re Pantages, supra, p. 539; In re Ward, supra, p. 491;
Matter of Preciado, supra, p. 332.
42
In re Torres, supra, p. 582.
43 In re Pantages, supra, p. 539; In re Ward, supra, p. 491; Matter of Preciado, supra, p.
332.
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cretion on the part of the lower court has been shown, a substantial number are denied on the basis that an inadequate showing, or no showing at
all, was made in the lower court that the defendant will attend the court
pending the appeal. The records will also reflect that many petitions are
denied because no prior application was made in the lower court or because
there was no compliance with Rule 32 (b).
Summarizing the present status of the applicable law, it appears that
a judge or court should exercise its discretion in favor of admitting a defendant to bail pending appeal, upon a showing which establishes practical assurance that he will attend upon the court when his presence is
required, unless the prosecution produces facts appealing to the court's
discretion which indicate that the defendant's release from custody pending appeal will present a danger to society or the community, or which
constitute a strong countervailing factor compelling enough to require that
he remain in custody. In this posture the law in California appears to
reconcile the conflict between the policy which recognizes the natural
reluctance to compel a defendant to undergo punishment until he has been
finally adjudged guilty by the court of last resort, and that which recognizes that society is entitled to protection from convicted criminals.

